Lewisham rail crash
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| Details | |
|---|---|
| Date and time: | 4 December 1957 |
| Location: | near St Johns |
| Rail line: | Lewisham by-pass line (BR Southern Region) |
| Cause | SPAD |
| Statistics | |
| Trains: | 2 |
| Passengers: | 2200[1] |
| Deaths: | 90 |
| Injuries: | 173 |
| List of UK rail accidents by year | |
The Lewisham rail crash was an accident on the British railway system which occurred on 4 December 1957 just outside St Johns railway station in Lewisham, south London. Ninety people were killed and 173 injured, making it the third worst rail crash in the UK in terms of death toll.
Contents |
[edit] Incident
The accident occurred in cold and very foggy conditions which were causing severe disruption to all train services in the London area. The fog is thought to have been especially thick in the cutting between New Cross and St Johns station, with the driver of the 5.18 electric train from Charing Cross to Hayes reporting that visibility was down to twenty yards or less in some places. His train was halted by signals shortly after St Johns station, and stopped with its last carriage under the flyover carrying the Lewisham to Nunhead branch.
It was hit from behind a few minutes later, at 6.20pm, by the delayed 4.56 train from Cannon Street to Ramsgate, which was hauled by Bulleid pacific 34066 ‘Spitfire.’ The driver of this train, W.J. Trew, had failed to see two yellow ‘caution’ signals between New Cross and St Johns. Signal sighting was especially difficult for steam train drivers, since the boiler and sometimes drifting exhaust ahead of the cab gave the driver a limited field of vision and the signals on this stretch of line were mounted on the right, whereas most steam locomotives by that time were left-hand drive. Drivers of steam trains that had passed the site in the hour before the accident had got their firemen to lean out on the right and spot signals, but Trew did not ask fireman C.D. Hoare to do so. It was never clearly established why. Nor was it ever clear exactly what he saw or, if he was aware that he should have seen signals, why he did not slow down.
Hoare did lean out as his train entered St Johns and saw the red signal at the far end of the platform, and Trew made an emergency brake application, but it was too late. The 400-ton train was travelling too fast to stop and crashed into the back of the Hayes Train at about 35mph.
The ninth and eighth coaches of the ten-coach Hayes Train were telescoped together, with the ninth riding up over the chassis of the eighth and destroying its body completely. Behind, the tender and first coach of the steam train were derailed and struck one of the supports of the Lewisham-Nunhead flyover. This buckled immediately and collapsed onto the first three coaches, crushing two of them almost flat. Further disaster was narrowly averted when the driver of a train about to cross the flyover noticed that it had buckled and managed to stop short. The first coach of this train was tilted over at an angle, but did not fall onto the wreckage below and was quickly evacuated and hauled to safety. Rescue work went on throughout the evening, since it was difficult and dangerous for the emergency services to reach passengers trapped in the crushed coaches under the flyover. Nevertheless, all survivors had been extracted and despatched to hospital before midnight.
The blame for the accident was placed solely on Driver Trew. He was tried for manslaughter in May 1958 but the jury could not agree on a verdict. A second trial was convened, but by then it was realised that Trew’s mental health had been severely impaired by the accident and its aftermath. No evidence was offered against him and he was discharged. Despite the verdict of the official enquiry it was widely felt that, although Trew had made some critical errors, some of the blame also lay with British Railways who had made slow progress with the development and installation of Automatic Warning System (AWS), which would almost certainly have prevented the accident. British Rail had been heavily criticised for their slowness in introducing the system after the earlier accident at Harrow, and in the wake of the Lewisham disaster work on AWS was speeded up. It was not, however, made mandatory until after the Southall crash in 1997.
The collapsed flyover was replaced by a temporary structure of military trestling, to facilitate the restoration of services. This structure proved to be very strong and durable, and as a result has never been replaced. It is still in use.
A plaque at Lewisham railway station commemorates the accident.
[edit] Similar accidents
[edit] References
- Hamilton., J.A.B. (1967). British Railway Accidents of the 20th Century (reprinted as Disaster down the Line).. George Allen and Unwin / Javelin Books. ISBN 978-0-7137-1973-4.
- Nock, O.S. (1980). Historic Railway Disasters (2nd ed. ed.). Ian Allan.
- Rolt, L.T.C. (1956 (and later editions)). Red for Danger. Bodley Head / David and Charles / Pan Books.
- Vaughan, Adrian (1989). Obstruction Danger. Guild Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85260-055-6.
- Tatlow, Peter (2007). Lewisham St John's Fifty Years on: Restoring the Traffic. Oakwood Press.
- Robert C Turner (1990) Black Clouds and White Feathers Chapter 8 Five Miles and 4 Seconds to Disaster Oxford Publishing Co ISBN 0-86093-457-8
[edit] External links
[edit] References
- ^ British Rail Disasters publ. Ian Allan, 1996
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Coordinates: 51°28′03.3″N 0°01′09.3″W / 51.467583°N 0.01925°W
